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Training for Good Governance & Civil-Military Relations

Impact Assessment of the Office of Transition Initiatives/Nigeria Program

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Executive Summary

Purpose—Review and analyze the impact of the country transition program in Nigeria, focusing on the Good Governance and Civil-Military Relations and report on results through the OTI strategy. Dates of the assessment were 15 March-3 April 2000. Interviews took place in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt and in Niger, Nasarawa, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Lagos States. Findings generally reflect respondents' perceptions and do not purport to reflect structural changes in the political system.

Findings

Good Governance—training stimulated an enabling environment of democratic governance for the 10,300 elected officials trained and their constituents. The conflict resolution module was especially appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for conflict mediation and resolution.

Civil-Military Relations—The program helped stimulate a process to aid the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule. It was the right application at the right time.

Program Results and OTI Reporting—The two programs have progressed significantly towards the expected results. These results contribute to OTI's goal of "Nigeria's democratic transformation advanced through rapid, pivotal, catalytic interventions."

Lessons Learned

Good Governance—a) women's inclusion in similar programs for political parity and equitable knowledge and representation would have been productive and b) training in conflict resolution paid high dividends in dealing with conflict in transition situations.

Civil-Military—a) visible results that directly reduce the potential for a return to military rule have been pivotal in Nigeria's democratic transition and b) a lack of funding by government to continue the full return to civilian rule could prove troublesome.

Program Results & OTI Reporting—a) the availability of a country strategic plan was useful and essential as a framework for this assessment, while b) absence of statements of expected results required their identification in order to complete the assessment.

Recommendations

Good Governance—a) OTI should (for future reference) provide parallel training for women leaders to sensitize them in democratic governance and b) provide additional training to all elected officials in conflict resolution to deal with continuing conflict. **Civil-Military**—a) OTI's initial strategy should include an estimate of downstream funding so government can maintain and continue improvement of projected achievements and b) ensure that its approach to training and TA in civil-military relations is hands-on, people-oriented and done in partnership with a professional training group.

Program Results and OTI Reporting—OTI should develop a performance monitoring plan, so that it can monitor against expected results and targets.

Abbreviations

APP—All People’s Party
BHR—Bureau of Humanitarian Response
IR—Intermediate Result
LGA—Local Government Area
MOD—Ministry of Defense
MPRI—(none: a U.S.-based consulting firm with expertise in civil-military relations)
NA—National Assembly
NAF—Nigerian Armed Forces
NGO—Non-Governmental Organization
NUJ—Nigerian Union of Journalists
OTI—Office of Transition Initiatives
PMP—Performance Monitoring Plan
R4—Results Review/Resource Request
SO—Strategic Objective
TA—Technical Assistance
U.S.—United States of America
USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development

Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Background

Following more than fifteen years of military dictatorship, Nigeria has recently embarked on a new experiment in democracy. In the period since the inauguration of the new president on May 29, 1999, the transition to civilian government has triggered a series of political, economic, and military reforms. These reforms are designed to restore national unity and provide a democratic government for Nigerians.

Given its foreign policy interests in Nigeria, the U.S. sees a critical need to ensure that this nascent democracy succeeds. As a pivotal part of a larger U.S. presence, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has been positioned to mitigate factors that may threaten the stability of Nigeria's fragile democracy. OTI has placed specific emphasis on civil-military relations and strengthening civil society activities.

B. Purpose

The stated purpose of this assessment is to review and analyze the impact of the country transition programs in Nigeria, an OTI priority country along with Indonesia and Kosovo. Similar assessments are being done in those two places. It is timed and designed to provide key information for the Bureau of Humanitarian Response's (BHR) results reporting document. The assessment is also designed to provide relevant findings to managers on the effectiveness, efficiency, and appropriateness of the programs reviewed. It also provides lessons learned and recommendations for management, with both short to mid-term and longer-term perspectives in mind. The assessment focuses on the Good Governance and Civil-Military Relations components of OTI's Nigeria program. (The Scope of Work for this assignment is located in Annex 1.)

A complementary activity to the assessment included support in implementing and facilitating an OTI workshop for its country staff on program monitoring and evaluation and grant administration. This took place in Lagos April 6-8, 2000.

C. Methodology

Specific methods used in this assessment include the following: key informant interviews, focus group interviews, site observations, and documentation review. (These are elaborated in a more detailed methodology section located in Annex 2.)

Table: Methods Employed in OTI/Nigeria Program Assessment—by Level of Use

Method Employed	Training for Good Governance	Civil-Military Relations
<i>Key Informant Interview</i>	11	8
<i>Focus Groups Interview</i>	7	1
<i>Observation Site Visit</i>	12	4

The assessment took place in-country during 15 March—3 April 2000. It included interviews, site visits, and documentation reviews in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and several selected sites in other urban and as well as rural areas. These sites were selected on the basis of a critical mass of program participants being present, the presence of OTI offices as a central base for the research activities, and the time frame of two weeks.

Random sampling could not be done because of time constraints. Therefore, we do not presume to represent regional, cultural, religious, or political party points of view. Our findings generally reflect respondents' perceptions of the impact of the training, but we do not directly attribute the success of the ongoing political transition to the training. Rather, the training served to help leaders articulate knowledge and capabilities they already had.

For purposes of analysis of the Good Governance and Elected Officials activities presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the following criteria are defined:

effectiveness—the extent to which an activity or project achieved its expected result,

efficiency—the degree to which it produced the expected result while minimizing

resources and financial cost; also the timeliness of the effort,

appropriateness—whether the activity fit the sociopolitical or economic environment, and

impact—degree of the effect of an activity in modifying a condition or behavior

D. Team Composition

The team consisted of the following individuals:

- ? a U.S. development professional specialized in monitoring and evaluation; democracy and governance; and Sub-Saharan Africa,
- ? a Nigerian development sociologist specialized in research design and evaluation; gender; and democracy and governance, and
- ? a Nigerian social scientist specialized in conflict mitigation; gender; and organization management.

E. Organization of Report

Chapter 2 reviews and analyzes findings for the Training for Good Governance Program. It is followed by Chapter 3, which does the same for the Civil-Military Relations Program. A review of program results in the context of OTI/Nigeria's strategic plan comprises Chapter 4. It provides an assessment of progress towards these results in the context of the BHR's R4 process. Chapter 5 includes overall conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

Chapter 2: Training for Good Governance Program

A. Introduction

During the past year, OTI in concert with the USAID Mission decided to train elected officials in such areas as constituency building, transparency, structural reform and local capacity building. Known as Training for Good Governance, this program included training for all elected officials at national and state levels, namely all Governors, other State elected officials, and National Assembly Members. It also covered more than half of all local elected officials.

The training, implemented by Nigerians who completed a training-of-trainers course provided by OTI, was carried out during a six-week period in mid-1999. This time frame was prior to the inauguration of the president and before the swearing-in of the newly elected officials. A total of 10,300 Nigerian officials were trained in workshops held throughout the country.

In addition to the above purposes, Training for Good Governance covered additional topics relevant to a government in transition to democracy. These topics included organizational structures of government, leadership roles, effective management of government resources, and the challenges of transparency and accountability. Tied to the training was a media strategy that was designed to bring national attention to the activity and to encourage a broad dialogue on the transition to democracy. From a management perspective, OTI's implementation of the Program was a test of its and its partners' capacities for rapid responsiveness, timeliness, and willingness to manage risk.

Key informant and focus group interviews of elected officials were carried out at three levels of elective government: Federal, State and Local. The interviews were administered in Abuja (the Federal capital) and in the states of Niger, Nasarawa, River, Bayelsa, and Lagos.

B. Findings

Overview—During the course of the interviews a number of key issues were identified among officials at the three levels of elective government. The more critical the issues identified, the more determined and challenged were the legislators to grapple with them.

Overall, the training was seen as a useful foundation, which has sustained elected officials' commitment to democratic governance. Prior to the training many of the elected officials were not sure of their roles and responsibilities. They had been elected to represent their people, whom they assumed responsibility for, but some of them had very little knowledge of the leadership style they should to adopt. The OTI/USAID training gave them the focus and direction they needed.

State legislators attribute the peaceful co-existence and cooperation in their houses of assembly to the good governance training. This is particularly interesting in Bayelsa and Rivers, where legislators represent areas that define each other as “enemies,” though in fact they are working together in the interest of the state.

Federal

Respondents included a senator in the National Assembly who chairs the senate committee on police affairs and who had chaired the defense committee during his first six months in office; a member of the house of representatives who is also leader of All People’s Party (APP); and an expert working as the clerk of the senate committee on appropriation and finance. Their level of understanding of the key issues was good. An especially poignant example of understanding the balance of power among democratic institutions was expressed by the House leader of the minority party, APP (see Box).

“Kaduna” and the Balance of Power among Democratic Institutions “The House debated the ‘sharia’ riots [that had been responsible for the deaths of many citizens] in Kaduna State. The discussions took place in a very deliberate, rational and constitutional manner. Once the House understood its role in this context it became clear that the constitution placed the resolution of the Kaduna issue in the hands of the Judiciary. Further discussion would not avoid the fact that this was a question for the appropriate authorities, that is, the courts. The House did, however, call for public calm in the matter.”—
House All Peoples Party Leader, Federal House of Representatives

Leadership—Federal elected officials depicted the leadership style they adopted as open and consultative. This style is new to leaders who have only known autocratic governance over the last several decades. The training exposed them to ways of working closely with their constituents in advocating the principles of justice, security and education. They felt that all elected leaders must have full knowledge of how to practice the tenets of democracy.

Coalition Building—Officials felt that they gained significantly from the training in coalition building. They indicated that building coalitions, negotiating, dialoguing, forming caucuses at different levels are all attributes that make democracy thrive. Some officials said that they had even begun to make strong links across party lines during the training, which they have continued into the present.

Democratic Governance—The principles of democracy were already familiar to the officials. But while they knew the principles, many had minimal knowledge of how to apply them in practical terms to the political process.

The Officials were often eloquent on the subject of democracy, speaking of how it thrives in environments of good accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law, maintenance of state security and the respect for the fundamental human rights and free opinions of citizenry. One of the participants narrated the story of a senator whose unpatriotic statements regarding the transition was repudiated, as seen in the box below.

Senator Who Rejects Democracy, Roundly Repudiated! During an interview with the press (*Tell*), Senator Waku was quoted as saying he would support the return of the military. This statement led to rancor within and outside the National Assembly (NA). His colleagues in the NA repudiated him, almost leading to his impeachment and his constituents disavowed his statements, saying their beliefs were just the opposite. The dispute was resolved when he was forced to publicly apologize by withdrawing his statement. *While the reaction was not a direct outcome of the good governance training, it underscores the precept of a robust civil society in action embodied in that training.*

Federal elected officials defined democracy as the capacity to respond to constituents' needs. Representatives' ability to respond to constituents' requests on a timely basis usually determines constituents' perceptions of the representative. These officials have had good relationships with their constituents because they are aware of their expectations and respond to them accordingly. They defined the following four aspects, covered in the training program, as critical to democracy: a) transparency and accountability; b) respect for the rule of law; c) maintenance of state security; and d) respect for fundamental human rights.

A key area of democratic governance discussed with elected officials was conflict management. Data showed considerable involvement in issues of civil strife. In response to acts of civil strife, the Senate established several investigative committees. Use of dialogue, compromise and listening skills for resolving these conflicts was effective. For example, there was a problem in Bayelsa State; the military were sent to round up youths who were stirring up trouble, and they started shooting at the people; the house committee on defense took up this issue:

We first castigated the youth for their disruptive behavior, we criticized the military for its excessive use of force, and then held a legislative hearing in which top military officials were asked to come to provide testimony about what happened.

State

Interviews were conducted in Rivers and Bayelsa States, including three key informants and two focus groups.

Leadership—Officials described the system of leadership commonly adopted by elected officials as an open, consultative process that promotes participation, exchange of ideas, networking and avoidance of unitary decisions.

Building Coalitions—Elected officials often hold informal meetings with other members of the House across party lines. The general consensus was that they embrace the views and ideas of others more easily because of the training. The process of dialoguing and networking was also found as a means of building consensus. State officials found these useful in their work and attribute them to the training.

Democratic Governance—Generally, these officials felt they had gained a new sense of doing business in a democratic setting. They have adopted the principles of transparency and

accountability. One official said that the first step to success in a democracy is to operate a transparent government. Others described the different ways in which they obtain feedback from their constituents.

The legislators also said that they do not control funds but can influence what funds can be spent on. They hold regular meetings with their constituents on their role as members in the house of assembly. Additionally, respondents received training on how to relate with the executive. They attributed their ability to resolve conflicts amicably and their new ways of identifying and responding to the needs of their constituents to the training.

Responsiveness to Public Needs—State officials claim that they respond to their constituents' needs effectively; however, they find that constituents who are members of the same party give positive feedback while those of opposing parties often criticize. As elected officials, they feel they were given mandates of trust and confidence, and that they are working hard not to erode that trust.

Local

Interviews were carried out in five local government areas, including Suleja, Tafa, Gurara in Niger State, Akwanga in Nasarawa State and Port-Harcourt in Rivers State). Local officials' understanding of the questions diminished as we moved from urban centers to rural areas. We were able, however, to capture a realistic picture of the democratic process in the rural area. Key informants were mainly chairmen of local government areas and in the case of Port Harcourt a councilor who was once a youth leader was interviewed.

Leadership—Local officials indicated that their leadership style is transparent, open, and participatory. Some reported that they use dialogue in addition to an evaluative approach that enables them to seek the opinion of constituents, receive consent for projects and assess whether the appropriate actions are being taken.

Building Coalition—Many of the elected local officials said that they started coalition building as early as during the training itself. Informal interactions with other participants in the training helped to promote a cross breeding of ideas that continued after the training. They all indicated the use of dialogue, flexibility, making sacrifices and compromise in building coalitions. This has helped them in relating effectively to their constituents and colleagues outside their jurisdiction.

Democratic Governance—Local officials agreed that the regular meetings they now hold with their colleagues and constituents give them the opportunity to interact effectively, identify the needs of their constituents, report back on progress made, and generate new ideas.

Most were satisfied with the knowledge they had acquired from the training on passing and formulating bills, though they have had all too little chance to practice their skills. Through their interactive skills, however, they have tried to correct this, by meeting with members of their

State assembly and representatives at the Federal level sometimes through their local government chairman. This then acts as an information conduit from the Ward to the State and Federal levels.

Responsiveness to Needs— A large number of these officials said their constituents were appreciative of their work. This is the first time the electorate had voted for local councilors. Participation and dialogue has helped build relationships that had never existed at that level of governance. They attribute these successes to the training. One official said that his constituents were encouraging him to campaign for the House in the National Assembly in the next election and they promised him their votes. Most of the respondents have received praise from their constituents in recognition and appreciation of the jobs they are doing.

Conflict Management— Training of local government officials included a module on conflict management. Local officials reported that they have engaged in resolving many conflicts since they assumed office. Conflict resolution has been practiced much more in the Niger/Delta area, where youth restiveness, communal crisis, land disputes and industrial crises between oil industries, workers and the community thrive. They found the conflict management training useful. Most of the respondents set up conflict resolution committees to help resolve issues of civil strife in their constituencies.

Many local officials mentioned the “sharia” crisis in Kaduna and its effect on their areas. The northern officials had taken quick action to avert similar uprisings among their constituents. They held meetings with religious, youth and community leaders, discussing with them the dangerous effects of such uprisings. Poverty, unemployment, marginalization of some areas in infrastructure development, ignorance and lack of quality education were mentioned as significant causes of these conflicts.

C. Analysis

In assessing the above findings, four evaluation criteria are applied. These criteria are used in assessing the good-governance training program in the context of the leadership contents, coalition building, democratic governance, responsiveness to needs, conflict management and civilian-military relations. These four criteria are effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and impact.

Effectiveness

The good governance program organized by OTI is recognized by elected officials as important for them in their participation in the transition. The training has given these officials good leadership direction that enables them to work in a participatory and responsive manner.

Efficiency

The content of the good governance training was well articulated. It is reflected in the seriousness that officials gave to this assessment. These officials expressed appreciation for the timeliness of the training in the context of the rapid political transition. They were encouraged that this assessment was taking place at this time, as it will encourage them to reappraise their work and become more efficient in applying the principles of the training. Some officials wondered what would have happened if they had not received the training. They were impressed with the efforts of the training team, especially in transmitting so much information in such a short time.

The timing of the workshop was considered just right: it occurred just prior to the new president's inauguration and to the swearing in of the newly elected officials.

Appropriateness

The fact that people had been exposed to autocratic leadership for almost two decades complicated the transition to democracy in Nigeria. Therefore, the OTI training gave direction for participating in the transition. Many indicated that they have adopted an open door leadership approach that encourages dialogue, community participation, and creating an enabling environment for good democratic governance.

The incessant civil strife seems to be more manageable as a result of the conflict resolution portion of the training. Elected officials are now able to mediate a dispute from an informed, balanced point of view. The result is less likelihood of a dispute leading to a breakdown of law and order.

Impact

The OTI training program contributed to the following: an open leadership approach; a participatory mode; efforts towards being transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs of the electorate; communal efforts towards infrastructure development; the successful resolution of conflicts; and the military acceptance of their new role.

The absence of women participants in this program, a reflection of their low participation in the political process generally, diminishes the full impact of the training.

Chapter 3: Civil-Military Relations Program

A. Introduction

Strengthening the civil-military relationship was a focal area of USAID/OTI's program given its critical importance to Nigeria's transition to democratic governance. Potentially military spoilers could have had a devastating impact on the transition. Therefore, it was critical for OTI to improve civilian oversight of the military as well as relations between civilians and military. Overall, the purpose of OTI support is to build relationships among civilians and military in order to develop an action plan for the reprofessionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces. OTI's effort aims to create the initial steps of the process, then to transfer the effort as seamlessly as possible to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

A series of interventions were designed to assert civilian control of the military and to reprofessionalize the Nigerian Armed Forces. These interventions include several parts, simplified as follows:

- (a) executive leader seminars offered in the north and south of the country, and including the senior leader seminar, 'Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy,'
- (b) strengthening the oversight by the National Assembly of the Ministry of Defense and military, and
- (c) an action plan to reorient civil-military institutions in Nigeria's new democracy,

The main focus of the assessment is (a) above, the executive leader seminars, held in September 1999 and January 2000. It is noted that the portion of the OTI civil-military program assessed is only a piece of the series of civil-military activities. Other activities include a seminar for National Assembly members in the house and senate to strengthen legislative knowledge of the MOD and to help members improve their understanding of oversight of military expenditures. A study visit by National Assembly Defense Committee took place at the end of March, 2000.

Key informant interviews were carried out with two senior MOD officials and one senior military official in Abuja, with the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly House Committee on Defense, and the executive director of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), also in Abuja. In Lagos, similar interviews were held with three non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives who had either participated in or were familiar with the senior leadership training seminar. One focus group interview with civilian staff from the MOD was held in Abuja. Site visits were made to four offices, including the MOD, National Assembly, NUJ offices, and an NGO office in Lagos.

While just under half of the participants in the seminars were military, they are poorly represented in our sample. This is a result of a military training visit that many of the trainees were taking at the time of the assessment.

B. Findings

Overview—Site visits and interviews pointed to initial steps towards improvement in civil-military relations. The senior leader seminar and the interactions of civilian and military leaders with the implementer, MPRI, a U.S.-based consulting firm with technical expertise in civil-military issues, have contributed to the process of redressing the civilian side of the civil-military equation. Civil-military relations that had deteriorated so severely are now a topic of an open, public dialogue. As a result of the assistance, several recommendations of the joint Nigerian-MPRI action plan will be implemented by the Nigerian and U.S. governments.

One indicator of the perceived success of the transition is the language used by civilians and military to depict the newly unfolding relationship. Oversight of the military by both executive and legislative branches is now common parlance in the MOD and the Legislature. Civilian officials and military alike speak of a reprofessionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) that is underway. Most interviewed, however, say that this process is moving at a modest pace, given the availability of resources and the poor condition of NAF infrastructure (both physical and human). The latter was wrought by decades of neglect and exploitation by a succession of military dictators.

Civilian Oversight of the Military—Most interviewees suggested that the transition to civilian oversight was on track, that appropriate actions were being taken to ensure the success of the transition, and they remained optimistic that in the end Nigeria would succeed. However, these same interviewees, from MOD, National Assembly, and other groups retained a guarded optimism about the full transition to civilian rule, given the culture of military autocracy that prevailed for several decades.

One stark exception to this skepticism derived from an interview with a leader in the National Assembly, who suggested that the transition is complete, and that the military knows its role, which is to protect the sovereign territory of the nation. Furthermore, as he noted, there is little possibility of breaching the new norm of the professional, apolitical, soldier. In his words, “no soldier is so stupid as to organize a coup...except one who wants to commit suicide...All service chiefs appointed by [President] Obasanjo are professional soldiers and loyal; they are not interested in politics.”

The most powerful tool for civilian authorities’ recapture of its proper role of oversight of the military, according to our interviews, is the Constitution itself. It speaks to the question of military adherence to the ‘rule of law’ and the specifically non-civilian role of the NAF. Military adherence to civilian rule is gradually becoming a part of conscious public policy, such that the public is beginning to take for granted the reversal of military domination of civilian government. An MOD official thought that civilians have to “assert their authority, to develop the perception that the military are not the only ones who can restore law and order.” Yet another indication of the transition was that President Obasanjo retired many of the high level military officials whom

he believed may cause problems for democratic rule. While not a direct outcome of the assistance, it is useful to mention that promotion of general officers is now done on the basis of merit, not regional or other types of favoritism.

There are four structures that contribute to enhancing the transition. The first and second have been in place for some time, long before the transition began, while the third and fourth are directly attributable to the civil-military training. First was the establishment of the Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, a training resource directed at senior and mid-level military officers and government civilian officials alike. A second was the establishment of the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, aimed at the same audience, and intended to sensitize its clientele to the government official's rightful role and duty of oversight, and the military officer's duty to obey civilian authority.

Placement of military personnel in MOD civilian-led departments, where they are deployed as subordinates to civilian directors, and where they advise civilians on the basis of their specific, technical knowledge, is yet a third action. That action was a direct result of the MPRI assistance rendered through OTI. A sign of increased civilian and military interaction, according to a focus group, is regular senior civilian and military meetings. During these meetings the Service Chiefs, other high-ranking military officers and Ministers and other high civilian officials discuss issues facing the civilian government and each of the military services. These officials then report back to their offices to brief their colleagues.

The fourth and last action to support the transition is the establishment of a formal liaison between the MOD and the National Assembly. This liaison includes MOD offices at the Assembly, as well as regular interactions between both military and civilian officials with members of the Assembly.

A further activity we learned about was a tour made by the Assembly House Committee of Defense of military bases around the country. It was organized by the MOD to familiarize legislators with the condition of the NAF, to expose them to problems of the military firsthand, and promote the legislator-military relationship through increased understanding.

Budgetary Oversight—A broad action cited by many respondents in the National Assembly's oversight of the military appropriation and expenditures. The MOD according, to one interview, has the largest share of the national budget. A legislator interviewed said he thought there was enough funding "to ensure a comfortable living for the military, provide new equipment, refurbish old equipment, and pay for the training to make them proficient to do their job." Because the military budget has been susceptible to manipulation in previous administrations (involving not just military but also civilian officials), oversight is all the more important. MOD officials took a somewhat different stance, stressing the under-funding of what the Ministry sees as necessary to re-professionalize the NAF. These differences would seem to reflect the usual tensions between the executive and legislative branches in a typical democratic setting.

The training covered the need for legislative oversight of the military budgets. It is a U.S. legislative mandatory audit requirement, according to which the Government of Nigeria must comply with the ‘Transparency of Budgets (Military Expenditures) Law.’ The assessment suggests that the MOD is more attuned to meeting this requirement.

Quality of the Civil-Military Relationship—Civilian staff of the MOD, in a focus group, suggested a broad array of qualities of the civil-military relationship, including mutual respect, *esprit de corps*, and full knowledge of each other’s positions. Quite different perspectives characterized senior MOD staff and senior legislators regarding the quality of the relationship. An MOD senior official stressed the mutual confidence aspect, the need to avoid stereotypes of one another, and faith in each other’s potentials. A senior legislator on the House Defense Committee focused on the civilian branch of government reinforcing the military to a point of readiness, through training and updating of equipment. Since, as the legislator indicated, the military had been “sanitized” of its political military officers, he believes the focus should be its material well being.

Since the military is no longer seen as an avenue to political office and wealth, the relationship between civil and military has a much better chance of “normalizing,” according to interviews. One sign of gradual improvement is the unacceptability of harassment of the public by the military. Another, slightly more mundane example is that soldiers must now pay for the bus, in contrast to the “free ride” of the past. A constraint mentioned by many respondents is that in its transitional state, the military is presently not of appeal to young men because it does not promise a “gold paved street.” Further, and perhaps more basic, because the ordinary “mess life” of officers and troops was degraded so much under previous military dictators, many of the basic comforts of military life are lacking. Both MOD senior staff and legislators agreed that improving these basic elements of military service life is critical.

On the Perception of the Likelihood of a Military Coup—As a general indicator of progress in the enhancement of civil-military relations in Nigeria, we asked if there was a fear of a military coup. A senior MOD official’s response is instructive:

I fear it in one sense, even though we see it as an abnormality. But in remembering the past, any African should dread a military coup; it is still too short a transition period to so quickly forget the past. I also believe that if there were a coup, members of the civil society will put up a stiff resistance, even at the mere fact of hearing any such news.

Several respondents were clear in their perceptions of how they thought the public would react to a coup. This response was shared in interviews with both civil-military and elected officials. In general, they said the public in general would simply not tolerate a return of the military to any role in the governance of Nigerian society. A final quote, from the same MOD senior official captures the sentiments of many concerning the relationship between civilians and military in Nigeria today: “Now, the military is to be driven by goals that are selfless, nationalistic, versus those of the past, which were selfish and opportunistic.”

Program Implementation Issues—This assessment did not emphasize the implementation of the civilian-military relations program *per se*. Nevertheless it is instructive to relate some findings that may be useful for future design and implementation purposes.

MOD and the OTI implementing partner, MPRI, worked closely in conceptualizing the transition process from military to civilian rule. Overall the participants were highly impressed with the caliber of the very senior and other retired U.S. military officers who conducted the senior leadership seminar. That said, it is less clear that military personnel had much direct input to the design of the curriculum of that seminar, ‘Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy.’ Senior civilian and military officials indicated that participants in the Abuja session of the seminar sensed the presentation was a bit one-sided, that it did not reflect the Nigerian side of the equation. This criticism was based on the perception of an absence of direct Nigerian input to the preparation and presentation of the seminar. Also, because the cost of the seminar was shared by the U.S. and Nigerian partners, the latter felt they should have participated in designing the seminar.

Seminar participants also had communicated that the model of a military rooted fully in the western tradition should have been balanced by input from the “non-western, developing country” context of the participants themselves. Granted, one of the intended outcomes of the seminar was to replace the Nigerian military model of rule with a model rooted in civil society and rule of law, they still felt that the Nigerian connection was missing.

A related issue is the style of implementation of the leadership seminar. Many participants reportedly said the seminar was “one-sided,” that is, too western in its tone. Second, they perceived it as “top-down” in its structure, reflecting a style of presentation perceived as “overly military” in its orientation. At the same time, the seminar was characterized as participatory in that discussion was encouraged. The training-of-trainers and their use in the seminar was suggested as a way of relieving some of the frustration. But while the first part of the seminar, the “presentation” portion, was seen to be “didactic,” opportunity was provided in the second part for a more participatory style, including a small group exercise. Participants, however, saw that exercise as too short.

The Lagos session of the seminar was seen in a different light. A civilian with no military background who participated in that session heard very favorable comments from the military participants. While many of these officers had already been exposed to the western model of civilian-military relations through study abroad, they were pleased with the training. They thought it would “enhance their careers” by informing them of how to operate in the new environment. And they indicated that they hoped the application of the training might contribute to creating a positive environment for the military.

Finally, senior civilian and military officials of MOD were clear that MPRI inputs were very important to the process of improved civil-military relations, since there was “probably no source in Nigeria that was likely to come up with the concept for the seminar.”

C. Analysis

The same four criteria are used for assessing the above findings as were employed for the good governance program.

Effectiveness

The Civil-Military Relations program has played a part in stimulating a process conducive to the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule. It was clearly the right solution, at the right time, to the problems posed by a series of autocratic military regimes and a civilian military cadre inexperienced in dealing with a subordinate military. Results associated with the program directly aim to reduce the potential for a repeat of the past military record. NAF Centers' curricula in professionalizing and sensitizing the military to civilian rule, the civil-military liaison with the Legislature, and military staff support of civilian offices of MOD are associated with OTI support. Budgetary oversight by the Legislature of military allocations and expenditures is another associated result.

Overall the program imprints are still present, although it is not clear if the program itself will have adequate funding from the MOD beyond the first year of implementation. So, while a commitment is there on the part of the Ministry, it is unclear how it will be able to sustain the program. The completion of the transition from military to civilian rule is incomplete and still somewhat tentative. Therefore, it is imperative for the Government of Nigeria and MOD to continue to pay particular attention to moving the transition along.

Efficiency

The approach to civil-military relations was adequate to fulfill its intended purposes. The training provided by MPRI represented a reasonable balance of hands-on, people-oriented activities with the technical assistance (TA) given to the MOD and NAF. Given the stature of the individuals provided by MPRI and the sophistication of the technical inputs to the training and TA, we are hard put to see the activity being done at less cost. Many of the persons interviewed felt the seminar should be delivered more broadly among the ranks of military and civilian staff, and even to the public. Nevertheless, the OTI package fit the more urgent purpose of triggering an interest and commitment by senior civilian and military officials to address such a critical issue as the possibility of repeating a return from civilian to military rule.

Appropriateness

The seminar presentations and technical assistance were generally appropriate to the activity purpose. The role of very senior retired U.S. military officers, the study of legislative oversight of the military budget, preparation of an action plan, and the leadership seminars were fitting in meeting OTI's aims.

In light of statements cited earlier by senior MOD officials, it seems that the style of presentation in the senior leadership seminar was perhaps a bit too formal, and also a notch too westernized. At least the participants did not feel totally comfortable with the overall approach to the subject at hand. They also thought that the seminar should have been longer, especially the small group exercises.

Impact

Given OTI's mandate to deal with transitions through "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic interventions," according to its mission statement for Nigeria, the program has achieved its goal. It has set the framework for a continued dialogue among civilian-military officials and for actions to put the words into practice. Furthermore, several important structures and processes are in place and Federal elected and appointed officials seem committed to the need to continue the effort. Only then will it be sustainable.

Program impact is probably the most elusive characteristic to trace. Nevertheless, footprints of the activity are clearly visible. Civilian and military officials, with a few exceptions, are speaking the appropriate language to reflect their concerns about the tentativeness of the transition. They are wary about the possibility of a return to military rule. This concern is probably a good sign in some respects, if it makes them ever more vigilant to the need to attend to the quality of this relationship.

In addition, the handoff by OTI of the action plan to the U.S. Department of Defense has gone very smoothly. This is evidenced by the visit, towards the end of the assessment, on April 1, of U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen to Abuja. There, he signed an agreement to assist the NAF in its reprofessionalization and thus to sustain the initial efforts of OTI.

Chapter 4: Program Results and OTI Reporting

A. Introduction

This chapter assesses each of the USAID/OTI strategic objectives (SO) and intermediate results (IR) and presents results on progress made toward the fulfillment of the SOs and IRs. It relies on the USAID/Nigeria strategy and the OTI revised country strategic plan as its framework. It also reflects the R4 (results review/resource request) process used by the Agency for measuring results and allocating funds. The OTI/Nigeria strategic plan articulates with USAID/Nigeria's strategic objective (SO) number 1, which is:

- ? Sustain transition to democratic civilian government.

A second point of articulation between the two strategies falls under this same SO1, at the level of USAID/Nigeria's intermediate result IR 1.3:

- ? Destabilizing forces mitigated

OTI's strategy, while clearly interfacing with the Mission strategy, differs in that its interventions in the Nigeria context are defined as "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic." While OTI's strategy is by definition and mandate only short-term, its results are surely intended to contribute to long-term, developmental results, a mandate of the Mission. OTI's revised country strategic plan (September 1999) itself has three SOs, which are:

- ? **SO1:** Democratic processes used to achieve tangible results on key transition issues
- ? **SO2:** Improved responsiveness of key decision-makers and institutions
- ? **SO3:** Reduced capacity of potential destabilizing forces from derailing Nigeria's peaceful democratic transformation

Underlying these SOs are three, selected IRs that reflect the Good Governance and Civil-Military activities and which are used to frame this assessment. These are:

- ? **IR1.2** Democratic institutions' capacity for representing constituents' interests/concerns enhanced
- ? **IR1.2.1** State/local government representatives capacity for reaching out to constituents improved
- ? **IR2.1** Decision-makers capacity to address constituents' priority issues strengthened
- ? **IR2.1** Military re-professionalized ...

While each of these IRs had associated indicators, we will not try to measure against each one of those indicators in this assessment. The reasons for this stance are that, one, insufficient time

has evolved for at least one of the programs to show definitive results and, two, even were there such results, the type of assessment called for in the Scope of Work makes collection of such detailed data impracticable. Nevertheless, we endeavor to obtain a clear sense of how well the program is faring against the above four IRs.

B. Results Achieved under OTI's Strategic Plan in Democratic Governance and Civil-Military Relations

In order to have some criteria to “measure” against, the team developed a matrix (see following page) of expected results, actual results and potential constraints. The rationale for the matrix is that, while the OTI strategic plan is explicit in its statements of the SOs and IRs, and as well includes indicators, it does not present a statement of expected results. That exercise awaits the preparation of a performance monitoring plan. However, to do our job of assessing results under the OTI plan, we felt the need first to try to articulate these results. We have done so in language that is general, non-technical and, we trust, more easily understandable. With this matrix in hand, we begin with a review of the first SO and its two IRs.

SO1: Democratic processes used to achieve tangible results on key transition issues

Progress toward achievement of SO1 is indicated by perceptions that people are expecting more of their elected representatives and appointed officials (Federal, State, and Local). Interview data reveal that the actual result achieved is as follows:

SO1 Actual Result: *people are successfully using the mechanism of government in meeting their needs and are demanding that their representatives be accountable and transparent.*

Our interviews suggest that people go to their leaders when they have problems or need their assistance. Examples where assistance has been rendered are: cases of wrongful dismissal from employment; resolution of conflict, including land disputes; assistance in combating outbreaks of disease; and provision of health clinics, among others.

Additionally, according to respondents, leaders obtain voters' views on key legislative issues and incorporate those views in the deliberations at the local, state, and federal government levels. Elected officials are more responsive to discussing the priorities of their people and allocating resources to meet them as indicated in the following quotes:

In the past, they [the electorates] could not get close to the government and had little contact with the people. Now we are more open, and people are feeling the impact of the government. They see the improvements with their own eyes ... Now people knock on your door to ask for help.

Constituents now channel their concerns to the executive through the representatives. They do not go directly to the government official (civil servants) since nothing would happen ...In this way, constituents have come to understand the concept of representation.

TABLE: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE USAID/OTI STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS

SOs/IRs	Expected Result	Actual Result	Constraints/What's Missing
SO1: Democratic processes used to achieve tangible results on key transition issues	Perceptions that people are expecting more of their elected representatives and appointed officials (Fed, State, Local)	People are successfully using the mechanisms of government in meeting their needs	People have to know how to access the system
IR1.2 Democratic institutions' capacity for representing constituents' interests/concerns enhanced	Democratic Governance Civil society participation Deliberative Capacity Conflict Resolution Coalition Building Compromise	The elements of good government are seen by most people to be in place	People may not see the necessity of how to actively use the mechanisms of government to meet their needs
IR1.2.1 State/local government representatives capacity for reaching out to constituents improved	Leadership Outreach (interaction) Dissemination(informing; educating)	Elected and appointed officials seen to be responsive to the electorate	Political infrastructure may be inadequate to provide effective representation
SO2: Improved responsiveness of key decision-makers and institutions	Perceptions that elected representatives and appointed officials are more responsive to public expectations	Elected and appointed officials feel that they are adequately representing the electorate	Party politics, ethnic-religious, and regional divisions could cause gridlock in governance
IR 2.1 Decision-makers capacity to address constituents' priority issues strengthened	Leadership (Rule of law) Communication Issues addressed in legislation	Elected and appointed officials feel that they are responding to critical issues affecting their constituencies	Poor mechanisms for processing the political will of the people
SO3: Reduced capacity of potential destabilizing forces from derailing Nigeria's peaceful democratic transformation	Perception that the transition from military to civilian rule can result in a stable society	People perceive that a stable society is achievable	Potential for a military intervention and a return to autocratic rule
IR 3.2 Military re-professionalized...	Transition from Military to Civilian Rule Civilian oversight of the military Budgetary oversight Quality of civil military relationship Structures in place to facilitate civil--mil relations and professionalization	People perceive that conflict can be resolved peacefully Perception that people will resist destabilizing forces, including strong resistance to any possibility of a military coup	Fear the existing structures are not adequately protective of the civil order (evidence of youths killing policemen and <i>vice versa</i>) Potential for destabilizing forces to overcome the will of the people to resist

IR1.2 Democratic institutions' capacity for representing constituents' interests/concerns enhanced

Interviews and focus groups conducted among elected and appointed officials indicate that elements of good governance are in place. Officials feel that they owe their electorate explanations for their actions or the lack of action. In contrast to the practice of previous regimes, transparency and accountability are important elements of the current administration. Our data reveals the following for this IR:

IR1.2 Actual Result *The training in good governance enhanced the elected and appointed officials' capacity to demonstrate a democratic style of governance (involving openness, participation, shared ideas, networking and brainstorming).*

The analysis also reveals the potential for dialogue, coalition building and compromise, indicating that the desire of the people to participate in governance is being met. That desire has been pivotal in the transition from military to civilian rule. The data show that most officials engage in dialogue with their colleagues in resolving issues of national interest. This approach represents a break from the past, which was characterized by exclusion of minority interests and the pursuit of selfish agendas. The good governance training is assessed to have contributed to the development of the new perspective. A National Assembly member interviewed in Abuja reflects views in the following quote:

...there are certain cardinal prerequisites that need to be known. New comers didn't know what to expect, i.e., the processes, the steps of how to process a bill, the steps to dealing with a bill in all detail, e.g. appropriation bills that come from the executive...the training was very important to our understanding of the concepts.

Some of the advantages of dialogue include the opportunity to see other peoples' point of view and by so doing, encourage tolerance and participation; discover the fundamentals of democracy (justice, security and education); collaborate for the attainment of diverse objectives; and promote rapport and compromise between and among the executive and the legislative arms of government.

Another indicator of institutional capacity to achieve democratic objectives is the approach to conflict resolution. Common conflicts include youth unrest, land disputes, and discord over political affiliation. Most participants said that they have mediated in many conflicts and that their involvement has prevented those conflicts from degenerating into a major breakdown of law and order in the area.

IR1.2.1 State/local government representatives capacity for reaching out to constituents improved

Most elected and appointed officials were found to make the effort to reach out to the electorate through visits and regular meetings, including the ones organized by the communities.

When asked how many times they have met with their constituencies over the last six months, almost all our key informants said they have visited their local areas more than six times. Similar answers were obtained from the focus group participants.

IR1.2.1 Actual Result: *Elected and appointed officials are responsive to the electorate.*

Local government officials, as expected, visit their constituencies more regularly than State and Federal Government officials. These meetings and outreach programs granted constituents unlimited access to their leaders, and, are catalytic in helping elected officials identify the key issues affecting the electorate. Some of the issues identified by the participants, beyond water and electricity, include local government creation, conflict management, and youth unemployment, youth unrest and the poor definition of the role of the traditional council in a presidential system. The knowledge of the voters' key concerns and needs is evidence of the potential for good leadership, that is the capacity to reflect the views, opinions, interests, needs of their constituencies in debates and discussions regarding bills and projects.

The consensus is that the workshop was critical in the officials' ability to respond to the needs of their electorate. One participant stated:

Before now, I thought that once you got elected, you wait for people to come to you with their problems or views. After the training, I realized that it is important to go the people, visit them in their homes, and reach out to them with information on latest issues being addressed. Hearing their problems equips you for action.

Most of the elected officials have used the opportunity of their visits to their local communities to educate their electorate on the principles of good governance. Such education has promoted voters' recognition of their rights and ability to participate fully within the system.

The inadequacy of political infrastructure to provide effective representation, involving the capacity for effective communication and feedback, is a constraint. Many rural areas lack good access roads. Most are not on the telephone grid. The telephone does not work in most areas that are on the grid, including urban centers such as Lagos, which coincidentally is a major industrial area. Only a tiny segment of the population has access to the Internet, mainly the elite in urban areas. Even if they were willing to use this forum to network with their electorate, most the officials do not know how to use the Internet. These limitations affect local government capacity to represent the electorate.

SO 2: Improved responsiveness of key decision-makers and institutions

Study data reveal that elected and appointed officials feel they are adequately representing their constituents.

SO2 Actual Result: *Perceptions are that elected representatives and appointed*

officials are responsive to public expectations.

Although the electorate was not included in our sample, which made it difficult to validate most of the claims made by the elected officials, most participants said that their constituents like the work they are doing.

IR2.1: Decision makers capacity to address constituents' priority issues

Progress toward this intermediate result is reflected by the leadership styles adopted by the officials, communication with constituents, and key issues addressed in legislation.

IR2.1 Actual Result: *The leadership style of elected officials is participatory, marked by openness, transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law.*

This contrasts with the autocratic system of the past where people had no choice. As one participant said,

Our leadership is so open to people, we speak with them freely, we go to them, and they come to us. In the past, people had no choice of who ran government.

There is ample evidence of communication among and between the officials and between the officials and the electorate. The officials meet with the public, organize outreach activities and other campaigns. In one constituency in Nasarawa State, such campaigns were used to mobilize communities for self help projects. In this locality, participants helped in completing the community health clinic. The local government officials indicated that self-help projects represent a new skill they had taught to their constituents. In the past, people waited for the government to do everything for them. This attitude is currently being transformed, demonstrating the decision makers ability to deal with constituents' priority issues.

Evidence that sufficient communication exists is indicated by the officials' knowledge of the key issues affecting the electorate. Some of those concerns include lack of basic infrastructure (water, electricity, and roads), environmental degradation, desertification, ethno-religious skirmishes, youth unrest, land disputes, host community-corporate relations, and allocation of funds to the community. Community-corporate relations are a predominant problem, triggering other major conflicts in the oil producing regions in the country. Several bills that deal with these problems have been passed. One State House of Assembly said it has passed five-six bills dealing with local community issues. Another said that it has passed four bills and twelve new ones have been proposed.

A key constraint to the achievement of IR 2.1 is party politics, ethnic-religious, and regional divisions. For instance, party politics almost caused a major riot in one of the Local Government Areas (LGA) of Nasarawa State. One family who lost the last election had initiated the crisis in order to get back at the family who won. Both families had contested on

separate political party lines. Evidence of ethno-religious riots abound in the country, including the famous Kaduna riots which claimed many lives, the Ife-Modakeke riots which is yet to be resolved, and youth crises in the oil producing states. Examples of the latter abound in Bayelsa, Delta, and River States. These riots, if not properly managed could derail the young democracy. Our assessment points to achievement of this IR, as follows:

Another constraint is a lack in the clarity of provisions of enforcing oversight of the executive by the legislature. Although one State House of Assembly participant indicated that his colleagues are able to enforce transparency and accountability on both themselves and the executive arm, the absence of constitutional backing for legislative oversight of the executive means that the balance of power between the two cannot be guaranteed. The lack of a legislative bill defining the structure and functions of the local council, which reflects a lack of clarity in the Constitutional provision for local governance, cripples performance at the local level.

Consequently, the LGAs have evolved different systems, including “Chairman in Council” system (Port Harcourt LGA), the presidential system (Akwanga LGA); other LGAs adopt the parliamentary approach. The application of a non-uniform method of governance across the country can cause a tremendous amount of confusion and reflect immaturity of the system. The lack of a State bill authorizing local government structure and functions is named as the major reason officials in one of the LGAs have not implemented lessons learned from the good governance training.

SO 3.0 Reduced capacity of potential destabilizing forces from derailing Nigeria’s peaceful democratic transformation

Progress towards the attainment of SO 3.0 is articulated in people’s perception that the transition to civilian rule can work. Consistent with this objective, most of the interviewees felt that a stable society is achievable.

SO 3.0 Actual Result *People perceive that a stable society is achievable*

Given that the military has been a key destabilizing influence in previous civilian administrations, a few steps have been taken to improve civil-military relations, engender military acceptance of civilian oversight and reprofessionalize the NAF. These include the establishment of the Center for peace and conflict resolution; Institute for policy strategic studies; and the Liaison office between MOD and the National Assembly. Other steps include the placement of military staff in civilian departments and the tour of military institutions by the Defence committee of the National Assembly. Insights provided by the latter enabled the National Assembly to better articulate the fears and concerns of NAF. These fears and concerns, involving the perception that a civilian government cannot adequately represent military constituents, were key to the military incursions of the past.

Overall, civilian-military relationships have improved within the short life of democratic governance; civilians are reaching out to the military and *vice versa*. Participants felt that there is need to formulate strategies that will enhance military acceptance of civilian oversight of the NAF. The key constraint is that the persistence of ethno-religions and regional divisions provide recipes for military coup.

IR 3.2 Military reprofesionalized

Movement toward IR 3.2 is articulated in two results presented as follows:

IR 3.3 Actual Results (1) *The perception that conflict can be resolved peacefully, and*
(2) *Perception that people will resist destabilizing forces, including strong resistance to any possibility of a military coup.*

Several results presented in this report are indicative of the first result. The current administration promote peaceful resolution of conflict using the mechanism of dialogue, coalition, compromise and consensus building. This initiative contrasts the practice in formal administration where leaders actually used the machinery of the state to propagate social conflict. With respect to the second result, officials feel that military incursion are possible but that it will be resisted. The consensus is that the Nigeria public is ready to resist any military intervention and the soldiers are aware of this fact. That awareness is a disincentive to military moves to destabilize the transition. The major constraint to the attainment of SO 3.0 and IR 3.2 is the potential for destabilizing forces to overcome the will of the people. The control of weapons by the military and the various crises, including the Sharia riot in Kaduna, ongoing Ife-Modakeke riots, youth crises in the Niger-Delta areas (oil producing regions), provide opportunities for that to happen.

Chapter 5: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

Good Governance Program

The good governance training was a useful tool for stimulating an enabling environment of democratic governance for the 10,300 elected officials trained and their constituents. OTI's intervention was timely, swift, appropriate and useful for the creation of an enabling environment for democracy to thrive. The effect of long military rule and incessant uprisings around the country would have constituted a threat but for the determination of the Nigerian civil society to resist any form of military coups. The conflict resolution and management component of the training of the local elected officials' training was appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for conflict mediation and resolution. The foundation laid by this program is strong and can be sustained with appropriate follow-up programs.

Civil-Military Relations

This program has played a significant part in stimulating a process conducive to the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule. It was clearly the right solution, at the right time, to the problems posed by a series of autocratic military regimes and a civilian military cadre inexperienced in dealing with a subordinate military. The completion of the transition from military to civilian rule is incomplete and still somewhat tentative.

Given OTI's mandate to deal with transitions through "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic interventions," according to its mission statement for Nigeria, the program has achieved its goal. It has set the framework for a continued dialogue among civilian-military officials and for actions to put the words into practice. Furthermore, several important structures and processes are in place and Federal elected and appointed officials are fully committed to the need to continue the effort. Only then will it be sustainable.

Program Results and OTI Reporting

Assessment findings revealed that the two programs evaluated have progressed significantly towards the attainment of the expected results. Consistent with the provisions of the SOs and the IRs, we learned that:

- ? People are successfully using the mechanism of government in meeting their needs and are demanding that their representatives be accountable and transparent;
- ? Elected officials' capacity to demonstrate a democratic style of governance, involving openness, participation, shared ideas, networking and brainstorming, has been enhanced;
- ? Elected and appointed officials' responsiveness to the electorate has been improved; and

- ? There is a perception that a stable society is achievable, indicated by the potential capacity to resolve conflict peacefully and minimize destabilizing forces.

The results appear to have cumulatively rolled up to OTI's goal of "Nigeria's democratic transformation advanced through rapid, pivotal, catalytic interventions." It is underscored, however, that many of the results depicted here are based on perceptions of persons interviewed, not on actual changes in the political structure. We therefore feel that the reader has to be a bit cautious in interpreting these results. Nevertheless, we are confident that the two programs have attained important achievements.

B. Lessons Learned

Each of the programs assessed, as well as the overall assessment of results in the framework of OTI's strategic plan, have generated lessons learned. These are as follows.

Good Governance Program

- ? The need to include women in similar training programs to make room for seemingly politically disadvantaged groups in respect to representation at all levels of government.
- ? There are too many conflicts to manage. Could democratic governance have triggered the expressive power of the people, could a military autocracy that people have always known give rise to the urge to violently seek redress? Training in conflict resolution is clearly useful in dealing with conflict in transition situations.
- ? The informal relationships fostered by the training among elected officials prior to their succession to office fostered an excellent enabling environment for good governance.

Civil-Military Relations Program

- ? A program to enhance civil-military relations in a setting where the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule is urgent, requires a timely, highly visible jump-start. Results that are readily visible and contribute directly to reducing the potential for a repeat of the past military record may be a critical element in such a transition as Nigeria is making.
- ? While the initial stimulus to jump-start a transition to civilian control over the military was necessary, an absence of a commitment by the Government to adequately fund the continuing needs could mitigate against long-term results. Continued vigilance by a government, but especially the defense ministry, to completing a transition from military to civilian rule is imperative.

- ? An approach to training and TA in civil-military relations that balances hands-on, people-oriented information and more sophisticated, technical concepts is appropriate. Use of senior retired U.S. military officers and provision of TA in such areas as budgetary oversight and preparation of an action plan are appropriate to achieving intended program results.
- ? Despite the need for considerable emphasis on a military orientation to training and TA, this does not mean that a military style needs to be applied to implementing those activities. A more participatory, adult learning orientation contrasts with the military orientation.
- ? Implementation by OTI of “rapid, pivotal, and catalytic interventions” to improving civil-military relations in an unstable political environment can be highly effective. When such interventions do not include strategies for the host country continuing to address these relations in a transition process that remains tenuous, there may be a cost.

Program Results and OTI Reporting

- ? The availability of a country strategic plan was not only highly useful but in effect essential for this assessment. This strategy shaped the framework for the methodology, as well as for all of the questions identified for use in the interview guides. Furthermore, it strongly shaped the data analysis process.
- ? An assessment such as this is constrained by the absence of statements of expected results. Such expected results were not available because OTI had only recently completed its country strategic plan. This made necessary the identification by the assessment team of some “proxy” results that it could use to guide the assessment.

C. Recommendations

Recommendations for each of the programs assessed, as well as the overall assessment of results in the framework of OTI’s strategic plan, are presented in the following section.

Good Governance Program

- ? OTI should (for future reference) provide some parallel training for women leaders at community, organization, and institution levels alongside good governance training for (as it turns out, mostly) men. The intent is for future good governance programs to sensitize women leaders in democratic governance, so they can contribute to the political dialogue alongside men. OTI should consult women leaders in an effort to obtain their input into approaches to redress this problem.
- ? OTI should provide additional training to elected officials at all levels in conflict resolution and management, in order to increase their capacity to deal even more effectively with present and potential conflict

- ? OTI should expand on its coalition building activities in future programs so as to promote cross-party relationships; this could be done in part through small group exercises in which different party members were invited to resolve an important issue.

Civil-Military Relations Program

- ? OTI should develop a case study of its experience in supporting enhanced civil-military relations. There are important lessons to be learned from different cases of supporting these often high-risk activities.
- ? OTI should include in its initial strategy for a civilian-military relations program an estimate of downstream funding by which government can maintain and continue improvement of projected achievements. Where such costs would seem to cut into military hardware and other projected costs, a case should be made for the importance of conflict mitigation in this high-risk arena.
- ? OTI should ensure that its approach to training and TA in civil-military relations balances a hands-on, people-oriented orientation with a more technical, information dissemination mode. While it should continue use of senior retired U.S. military officers, it should do so in partnership with a professional management training organization that would focus on the training process.
- ? OTI should ensure that training in its civil-military programs employs a participatory, adult-learning orientation, in which participants are considered and used as an important resource of knowledge and experience.

Program Results and OTI Reporting

- ? OTI/Nigeria should develop a performance monitoring plan (PMP) with clear statements of expected results and targets incorporated in it. OTI can back into this process through its program reviews and testing the matrix presented in Chapter 4. At some point, however, technical assistance should be introduced in developing a PMP.

Annex 1 – Scope of Work

Project Title: Nigeria - OTI Impact Assessment

Internal Client at USAID: USAID/BHR/OTI

Background

- ? The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) wishes to assess the impact of its country transition programs in Nigeria which is one of its priority countries. The report is timed to and designed to provide key information for BHR/OTI's R4 document and other reports.

Objectives of Task

- ? The objectives of this task are as follows:
 - ? Identify key field programs for review.
 - ? Collect qualitative and/or quantitative data on those principal field program/activities
 - ? Provide a qualitative and quantitative review of data on the impact/results of key field programs
 - ? Provide a brief analysis of the entire emergency transition program with a focus on incorporating major findings from the impact assessment.

Process Steps

- ? The task will be accomplished by:
 - ? Conducting interviews with OTI staff and grantees
 - ? Conducting focus groups with beneficiaries of OTI programs
 - ? Reviewing grantee reports, evaluations and other background material

Deliverables

- ? The consultant will provide the following deliverables to the client
 - ? Workplan and methodology
 - ? Draft and final reports
 - ? Exit briefings with OTI/Nigeria and OTI/Washington

Project Timeline

- ? The work will be performed from March 13th 2000 to April 8th 2000.

Annex 2 – Methodology

Introduction

The methodology is designed to assess two of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) major programs in Nigeria:

- ? *Training for Good Governance* and
- ? *Civil-Military Affairs*

Following OTI's Scope of Work for an Impact Assessment (see Annex 1), this study identifies critical field activities, collects data that demonstrate results, and reports on OTI's contribution to the transition to peace and democracy in Nigeria. The assessment reviews programs deemed by OTI as "already achieving significant results." It uses mainly qualitative data, analyzes these data in the context of the emergency transition program, and reports the product of the analysis in report.

While this assessment is designated by the term "impact," it also shares some elements of a process evaluation in that aspects of at least one of the two programs are not yet completed. So, while we will search for the footprints of impact of the training of elected officials program, we will look for interim results of the civil-military program.

B. Evaluation Framework and Linkage to the R4 Process

The assessment uses the USAID/Nigeria strategic plan and the OTI revised country strategic plan for a framework. It also reflects the R4 (results review/resource request) used by the Agency for measuring results and allocating funds. While it is not often that OTI and a country mission work side-by-side, this is the case for Nigeria

OTI's strategy, while clearly interfacing with the Mission strategy, differs in that its interventions in the Nigeria context are defined as "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic." While OTI's strategy is by definition and mandate only short-term, its results are surely intended to contribute to long-term, developmental results, whose mandate is the Mission's.

While indicators have been identified for the OTI strategic plan, we will not try to measure against these indicators *per se*. The reasons for this stance are that, one, insufficient time has evolved for the programs to show definitive results and, two, even were there such results, the type of assessment called for in the Scope of Work makes collection of such detailed data impracticable. Nevertheless, we endeavor to obtain a clear sense of how well the program is faring against the strategic objectives and intermediate results.

C. Approach

Given the short timeframe for this research (two weeks of field research), the approach relies on rapid appraisal methods. These methods are neither fully informal nor formal, and borrow from each approach. Methods used in this assessment largely lack quantitative data from which generalizations can be drawn on the entire population of Nigerian elected officials benefiting from Good Governance training or military and civilian officials participating in the Civil-Military Relations activities. Nevertheless, findings are valid for reporting results and sufficient for decision-making needs.

Specific evaluation questions are generated to meet the requirements of the rapid appraisal approach. These are designed for each of the populations affected by the two programs. Included in guides designed for each type of interview used, these questions are presented in Annex 3.

Techniques used in supporting the evaluation approach are four in number:

- ? Key Informant Interview
- ? Focus Group Interview
- ? Direct Observation and
- ? Documentation Review

The first, key informant interview, is used with participants in the Good Governance program, namely recently elected local, state and national representatives, as well as military and civilian officials for the Civil-Military activity. Focus group interviews are also used with the same participants. Direct observation is made at all the sites visited during this assessment. A review of documents was made of all reports concerning these two programs. Titles of these are included Annex 5, References.

D. Site and Interviewee Selection

Easier access to potential participants to interview in Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt and surrounding areas, as well as time constraints, dictated the selection of those sites for visits. OTI offices in those locales arranged the interviews for the assessment. In some cases the possession of a telephone was important in locating participants to determine their availability. However, an effort to locate participants who did not have telephones, especially those in rural areas, was successfully made. An information list of participants in the Good Governance program and, where available, a telephone number, facilitated the selection process, along with the persuasive cajoling of OTI Office heads and staff.

One clear constraint to the availability of participants from the civil-military activity was the paucity of military officers available to interview. Several of them had purportedly been

reassigned out of Abuja, where the majority of participants reside, and, more importantly, the majority was away on a military training visit. A number of Ministry of Defense civilian officials was available, as well as some representatives of the press, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the House of Representatives, and a Naval Commodore (Admiral).

E. Team Composition

Team members included:

- ? a U.S. development professional specialized in monitoring and evaluation; democracy and governance; and Sub-Saharan Africa,
- ? a Nigerian development sociologist specialized in research design and evaluation; gender; and democracy and governance, and
- ? a Nigerian social scientist specialized in conflict mitigation; gender; and organization management.

Annex 3 – Interview Guides

Table: Interview Guide for Good Governance Interviews Coded by SOs & IRs

1.	What kind of leadership style have you adopted as a result of the training? [e.g. leadership as someone who represents the people] (Elaborate)	SO2 IR2.1
2.	What have you done as a leader to demonstrate your leadership? (Describe)	SO1 IR1.2
3.	In what ways have you participated in a dialogue with your newly elected colleagues concerning issues of [choose one (national) (state) (local)] importance? How did your participation in such a dialogue affect the outcome? (Describe).	“
4.	Have you seen a “new way of doing business” as a result of the training (assuming the individual knows something about the “old way”)? (Describe) How is it different? (Explain).	“
5.	How has your understanding of the fundamentals of democracy and democratic governance helped you to do a better job of representing your constituency? Of interacting with the executive branch? (Explain) How much of this understanding is directly to the training you received?	“
6.	How has the training helped you to become more transparent and accountable to your constituents?	SO2 IR2.1
7.	How has the training helped you to become more transparent and accountable to your constituents?	SO2 IR2.1
8.	Have you addressed any issue of civil strife since you got elected and how has the training helped you in this process participation in such conflict management? (Explain)	SO3
9.	What experience have you had in your legislative role in conflict management? (Elaborate) How did the training affect your	“
10.	How often have you applied coalition building, compromise or other, similar approaches in your negotiations? (Describe) Where did you use them? How big a difference did they make?	SO3 IR3.2
11.	How do you assess your constituents’ perception of your responsiveness to their needs? (Describe) What do your constituents think about the job you are doing? (Describe)	SO1 IR1.2.1
12.	Have you participated in public meetings with your constituents that dealt with “critical transition issues”? What are some of these issues? What was the approach used to dealing with these issues?	SO3
13.	How have you been able to educate others (e.g., constituents, and executive branch officers) in the lessons learned from the workshop in good governance? (Describe)	SO2

- | | | |
|-----|---|------------|
| 14. | (a) [Local Government Only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer” role in your position as a local government official? If so, how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes them reformers?
(b) [National and State only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer” role in your position as legislator? If so, how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes them reformers? | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 15. | What are one or two “best practice” stories of how your training in good governance has been applied to practical situations since you were sworn into office? (I.e., what are some good examples? Provide) | GENERIC+ |
| 16. | What constraints have you experienced in executing your acquired skills?[give examples] What practical steps have you taken to address these constraints.[Describe] | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 17. | How many times in the last six months have you met with your constituents? What are the most important issues your constituents are relating with you? | SO1, IR1.2 |
| 18. | [National and State] What legislative issues are you addressing that concern your constituents’ priority issues? | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 19. | How many bills have you participated in formulating and sponsoring? | “ |
| 20. | Are you fearful of a military coup? | SO3 IR3.2 |
| 21 | Do you feel secure that today’s Nigerian soldier can defend your right? | “ |
| 22 | Do you feel that today’s Nigerian Soldiers are more professional than they were a year ago. | “ |
- + Fit under all SOs

Table Qualitative Check List for Good Governance Interviews

1.	What kind of leadership style have you adopted as a result of the training? [e.g. leadership as someone who represents the people] (Elaborate)	SO2 IR2.1
2.	What have you done as a leader to demonstrate your leadership? (Describe)	SO1 IR1.2
3.	In what ways have you participated in a dialogue with your newly elected colleagues concerning issues of [choose one (national) (state) (local)] importance? How did your participation in such a dialogue affect the outcome? (Describe).	“
4.	Have you seen a “new way of doing business” as a result of the training (assuming the individual knows something about the “old way”)? (Describe) How is it different? (Explain).	“
5.	How has your understanding of the fundamentals of democracy and democratic governance helped you to do a better job of representing your constituency? Of interacting with the executive branch? (Explain) How much of this understanding is directly to the training you received?	“
6.	How has the training helped you to become more transparent and accountable to your constituents?	SO2 IR2.1
7.	How has the training helped you to become more transparent and accountable to your constituents?	SO2 IR2.1
8.	Have you addressed any issue of civil strife since you got elected and how has the training helped you in this process participation in such conflict management? (Explain)	SO3
9.	What experience have you had in your legislative role in conflict management? (Elaborate) How did the training affect your	“
10.	How often have you applied coalition building, compromise or other, similar approaches in your negotiations? (Describe) Where did you use them? How big a difference did they make?	SO3 IR3.2
11.	How do you assess your constituents’ perception of your responsiveness to their needs? (Describe) What do your constituents think about the job you are doing? (Describe)	SO1 IR1.2.1
12.	Have you participated in public meetings with your constituents that dealt with “critical transition issues”? What are some of these issues? What was the approach used to dealing with these issues?	SO3
13.	How have you been able to educate others (e.g., constituents, and executive branch officers) in the lessons learned from the workshop in good governance? (Describe)	SO2

- | | | |
|-----|---|------------|
| 14. | (a) [Local Government Only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer” role in your position as a local government official? If so, how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes them reformers?
(b) [National and State only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer” role in your position as legislator? If so, how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes them reformers? | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 15. | What are one or two “best practice” stories of how your training in good governance has been applied to practical situations since you were sworn into office? (I.e., what are some good examples? Provide) | GENERIC+ |
| 16. | What constraints have you experienced in executing your acquired skills?[give examples] What practical steps have you taken to address these constraints.[Describe] | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 17. | How many times in the last six months have you met with your constituents? What are the most important issues your constituents are relating with you? | SO1, IR1.2 |
| 18. | [National and State] What legislative issues are you addressing that concern your constituents’ priority issues? | SO2 IR2.1 |
| 19. | How many bills have you participated in formulating and sponsoring? | |
| 20. | Are you fearful of a military coup? | SO3 IR3.2 |
| 21. | Do you feel secure that today’s Nigerian soldier can defend your right? | |
| 22. | Do you feel that today’s Nigerian Soldiers are more professional than they were a year ago. | |
- + Fit under all SOs

Interview Guide for Civil-Military Relations Interviews

ALL--SO3 IR3.2

1. What do you see, as some of the most important means for giving civilians authority over the military? (Describe)
2. What are some of the steps that are being taken to improve relationships between civilians and military?
3. What are the most important qualities in the relation between the military and the civilians? [E.g., is it built on trust, confidence, and communications?]
4. How well would you say the improvement of civilian-military relations has gone so far? (Explain) What are some good examples of such improvements?
5. What are some of the specific programs and policies to assist in the re-professionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF)? (Please list and briefly describe)
6. What efforts are being made both in the Ministry of Defense and NAF to develop and define a basic relationship between the officer's corps and a democratic society? (e.g., in terms of legal status, institutional arrangements, and military and political activity--describe)
7. What kinds of issues have arisen in moving from the policy stage to implementation of new ways of organizing the civilian—military relationship? (Describe)
8. What specific steps are being taken to re-professionalize the NAF? (e.g., is civil--mil relations training being offered, is transition assistance being offered to NAF personnel leaving the services, etc.?)
9. What actions have been taken to improve relations between the legislative and executive branches concerning military matters? (List/Describe) Are there any new structures in place to provide legislative authority? (If yes, describe)
10. Are you aware of any plans to set up a legislative liaison staff between the MOD or NAF and the legislature? (Yes/no/if yes, list/define)
11. Are you aware of any actions taken to assist the National Emergency Management Agency in its interactions with the MOD? (Yes/no/if yes, list/define)
12. What steps are being taken to enhance professionalism in the military?)
13. Are you aware of whether or not the audit plan for FY99 financial statements for MOD has been carried out? (If yes, describe)
14. (Military ONLY) How would you assess your role as a soldier today? (Describe)
15. (Military ONLY) Is being a soldier of less appeal to you today than it was a year ago? (Explain)
16. (Civilians ONLY) How would you assess the role of the soldier today? (Describe).

Annex 4 – Work Plan

WORKPLAN—ASSESSMENT OF OTI/NIGERIA PROGRAMS & PARTICIPATION IN MONITORING & EVALUATION WORKSHOP

DATE/PLACE/PERSON	STEP IN EVALUATION PROCESS	DESCRIPTION OF WORK
March 10/WDC/S Roquitte (USAID)/ Z Nelson, S Gnanaselvam, D. Cosloy (PWC)	Planning TDY, field visits, Logistics	Meetings to review assignment / Arrange logistics
March 13/WDC/Travel to Lagos	Develop preliminary work plan	Select sites, design preliminary questionnaires
March 14/arrive Lagos	Logistics	
March 15/Lagos/L DeSoto, C Becerra, S Hayatuddini (OTI); S Suggs, M Brown (USAID)	Review Civ-Mil/Governance programs, review workshop plan	Adapt and complete workplan
March 16/Lagos/OTI staff (cont'd.)	Program review of Civ-Mil program; develop guides for Good Governance key informant/focus group interviews	Meetings to discuss objectives, activities and general progress of program; review OTI strategic plan, R4 requirements; review elected officials info. sheets and post-training evaluations
March 17/Lagos/Government of Nigeria officials	Develop guides for Civil-Military Relations key informant/focus group interviews	Develop list of prospective interviewees for Good Gov and Civ-Mil interviews in Abuja, Pt. Harcourt, Lagos; Meet FSNs and develop SOWs for their contribution
March 18/Lagos	Refine design of interview guides	Complete design of research methodology, including interview guides/questionnaires
March 19/Lagos-Abuja	Logistics	Travel to <i>Abuja</i> ; meet with Idris Kuta

March 20 <i>Abuja</i> /Ministry of Defense	Interviews with Ministry of Defense(MOD)—Minister of State for Defense and Support Staff Committee	Meet MOD officials; arrange field visits, interviews
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DATE/PLACE/PERSON	STEP IN EVALUATION PROCESS	DESCRIPTION OF WORK
March 21/Abuja/House Members/Local Elected officials	Field visits to <i>Suleja</i> Local Gov't Area in Niger State Focus group interview at MOD; Key informant interview with Deputy Chairman House Defense Committee	Meeting with sampling of local and state officials participating in good governance training; interviews for Civ-Mil activity
March 22/Abuja/House Reps./Local Elected Officials	Field trip to Local Gov't Council, <i>Akwanga</i> , in Nasarawa state Focus group and key informant interviews; prepare interview summaries	Meetings with local elected reps; Key informant interviews with Senate Deputy Chairman, Appropriations Committee; Clerk, Senate Committee
March 23/Abuja/Pt. Harcourt/ Yenagoa/National Assembly members, State House members	Continue interviews Prepare summaries of interviews	Part of team travels to <i>Pt. Harcourt</i> , part remains in <i>Abuja</i>
March 24/Abuja/Pt. Harcourt/ Rivers State/State House of Assembly members/Local Government area	Continue interviews for Good Gov/Civ-Mil programs	Analyze data for report presentation/against OTI strategic plan
March 25/Abuja-Port Harcourt	Travel Begin Report Writing	Travel from <i>Abuja</i> and <i>Pt. Harcourt</i> to <i>Lagos</i>
March 26/Lagos	Report preparation	Prepare first draft
March 27/Lagos	Report preparation	Complete and present first draft to OTI/Lagos and WDC
March 28/Lagos	Continue report preparation	Complete annexes for draft final of report
March 29 Lagos/Elected officials	“ “ “ “ Meet with NGOs	“ “ “ “
March 30/Lagos/Elected officials/OTI Staff	Continue report preparation Meet with NGOs	“ “ “ “
March 31/Lagos/USAID/OTI	Return of first draft for revisions Meet with NGOs	Begin revisions

DATE/PLACE/PERSON	STEP IN EVALUATION PROCESS	DESCRIPTION OF WORK
April 1/Lagos	Revise first draft Prepare M & E workshop contributions	Continue revisions
April 2/Lagos	Continue revisions on draft report	“ “ “ “
April 3/Lagos	“ “ “ “	“ “ “ “ Turn in Revised draft to OTI/Lagos and WDC
April 4/Lagos	Continue preparations for M & E workshop	Preparation of workshop curriculum and materials
April 5/Lagos	“ “ “ “	“ “ “ “
April 6/Lagos/Workshop retreat site	Participate in implementation of workshop	Participate in and support facilitation of workshop
April 7/Workshop Site	” “ “ “	“ “ “ “
April 8/Workshop site/return to Lagos/depart Lagos to WDC	“ “ “ “ End of activity	“ “ “ “ Travel to US
April 9/Paris, Dulles USA	Logistics	Continue return travel to US

Annex 5 – Persons Contacted

USAID/Washington

Sheila Roquitte, OTI, Coordinator, Nigeria Program
Michael Korin, Humanitarian Response Coordinator, ENI Bureau
Heather McHugh, OTI, Senior Program Development Officer
Anne Lee, OTI, Senior Program Development Officer

USAID/OTI and USAID/Nigeria

Lisa Desoto, OTI, Country Director
Melissa Brown, USAID Democracy Officer
Michael Braxton, OTI Press Officer
Carmenza Becerra, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Shan Hayatuddini, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Ime Essien Udom, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Idris Kutu, Head, OTI Abuja Office
Reggie Simmons, OTI Kano Office
Tom Simpson, USAID Energy Advisor
Jamie Raile, Head, OTI Port Harcourt Office
Simon Enajedu, OTI Port Harcourt Office

CIVIL-MILITARY

Mrs. Modupe Adelaja, Honorable Minister of State for Defense
Dr. Segun Matanmi, Special Assistant to the Minister of State, MOD.
Commodore K.C.K. Amauche, Naval Adviser, Ministry of Defense
Mr. H. F. Osobu, Ministry of Defense
Alhaji Kutiji, Ministry of Defense
Mr. S. O. Golo, Ministry of Defense (Coordinator for MPRI)
Mr. F. I. Chukwura, Ministry of Defense
Ms. E. C. Nwogwugwu, Ministry of Defense (Press officer)
Hon. [Major] Ngada, Deputy Chairman, House Committee on Defense
Innocent Chukwuma, Executive Director, Center for Law Enforcement
Education
Muhammad Khalid, Nigeria Union of Journalists (National Secretary)
Mr. Ishola Williams (Ret. Maj. Gen.), Transparency in Nigeria (NGO), Lagos
Mr. Innocent Chukwuma, Centre for Law Enforcement Education, Lagos

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Abuja

Senator Nwagbara, Chairman Senate Committee on Police Affairs / Former Chairman Senate Committee on Defense.

Honorable [Barr.] Mohammed U. Kumalia, House APP Leader, Federal House of Representatives.

Mr. Friday Efodu, Clerk of the Senate Committee on Appropriation and Finance.

Niger State

Suleja Local Government Area

Hon. Uman Magaji Kwamba, Maje Ward

Hon. Alhaji Ahmed J. Bawa, Bagamma 'B' Ward

Hon. Mohammed Kabir Aliyu, Bagamma 'A' Ward

Hon. Alhassan Nuhu, Iku South 11 Ward

Hon. Awwal A. Dattijo, Magaji Ward

Hon. Alhaji Yahuja Aliyu, Hashimi-A Ward

Hon. Ado Danlami, Wambai Ward

Hon. Abdulhabib Saidu Barau, Kurmin Sarki Ward

Tafa Local Government Area

Mr. S. B. Gwomna, Chairman, Tafa Local Government

Gurara Local Government Area

Hon. J. G. Koce

Hon. Samson B. Talukpe

Hon. Thomas M. Yerima

Hon. Aliyu D. Madugu

Hon. Musa Garba

Hon. Gideon Hassan, Izom Ward

Hon. Isaiah Chanse, Kabo Ward

Hon. Baba Umar Abdulkadir, Chairman Gurara Local Government

Nasarawa State

Akwanga Local Government Area

Hon. Mwanza Isa Mohammed, Chief Whip, LGA Council

Hon. Philip Limbo, Councilor, Chairman Finance Committee
Hon. Forouk Gyado, J.P. Chairman, Primary Health Care
Sale Chigbe, Personnel Secretary
Hon. Albert A. Gado, ‘Speaker of the Legislature’

Rivers State

Hon. Amadi Brilliant
Hon. Moses Tobin
Hon. Legigrato Innocent
Hon. Ben D. Odun
Hon. Victor Inhunwa
Hon. Adolpus Sege Worlu
Hon. Amadi Moris Onyemaechi
Hon. Amadi Kenneth
Hon. Ogoloma Maxwel
Hon. Ineye Ingbaifegha
Hon. Alex A. Ajikere -a former youth leader.

Rivers State House of Assembly

Hon. Paul Awoyesuku
Hon. Glory Chiku
Hon. Magnus Abe
Hon. Tonye Harry
Hon. Amaechi C. Rotimi
Hon. Tonye Harry
Hon. Tamunsisi G. Juja
Hon. Kennedy S. Ebeku
Hon. Tolofasi G. Fubabu
Hon. Orunari Adokiye
Hon. Ideozu O. Kachukwu
Hon Aloys A. Nweke
Hon. Otelemaba D. Amachree
Hon. Marcus N. Ejii
Hon. Godstime B. Horsfall

Bayelsa State

Bayelsa State House of Assembly

Hon. Chief Prosper Idafe Nwaguzo
Hon. Charles Immanuel

Hon. I.T. Komonibo
Hon. Bzi Onniye

Lagos State

Tive Denedo, Director of Campaigns, Media Rights Agenda
Maxwell Kadiri, Legal Officer, Media Rights Agenda

Other

Prince Obio/Akpor, Local Government Area

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